The IHRA Definition’s Global Impact: How Anti-Antisemitism Legislation Threatens Academic Freedom in Germany, the United States, and Canada

by Braden Russell (University of British Columbia)

This piece proved challenging to write. Initially I planned to provide a straightforward account of Germany’s problematic anti-antisemitism legislation—and similar initiatives in Canada and the United States. I thought I could easily summarize these developments based on my training in German-Jewish Studies and my lived experience as a Jewish person with personal and professional ties to all three countries. But the reality of our present kept shifting with each unfolding historical event of relevance to the project. Donald Trump won the United States presidential election and Canada’s Committee of Justice and Human Rights released reports on Islamophobia and antisemitism on college campuses. This all happened within a period of four months. What I planned to be a short blog post transformed into a challenging task.

This piece, beyond providing what I initially hoped to be a report on Canadian, American, and German responses to the IHRA (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) working definition of antisemitism, needed an analysis of the IHRA definition of antisemitism itself in light of the issues it causes to people interested examining historic and emerging human rights violations and genocide the Israeli State is committing against Palestinians. Both my scholarship and lived experience teach me that it is imperative to speak up about antisemitism. In light of the strengthening antisemitic global right, international and local policy informed by the operations of antisemitism are vital. However, when false invocations of antisemitism grounded in and legitimatized through IHRA are used to censor and erase voices protesting injustice and genocide—and when they are used to prevent academic discussion, as is currently the case—I believe we, as Germanists, must stand against the IHRA definition. Moreover, we must name and resist the infrastructures upon which it draws to suppress particularly Palestinian voices and Palestinian solidarity movements.

The IHRA Definition of Antisemitism

IHRA is an intergovernmental organization that was founded in 1998 by thirty member countries to address research, memorialization, and education of the Holocaust and the genocide of Roma. Its working definition of antisemitism was created in 2015 and was adopted by the member states in 2016. It begins as follows:

“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” (“What Is Antisemitism?”)

Also included in this definition are eleven examples illustrating what could count as antisemitism under this definition. For instance, IHRA concludes: “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor” (“What is Antisemitism?”).

The definition has been mired in controversy since its creation. In particular, scholars in Jewish Studies, Holocaust Studies, History, Political Science and in other disciplines have pointed out that this definition is vague and broad and that seven out of the eleven examples are specifically related to the State of Israel in some fashion. Interestingly, the IHRA definition attempts to underscore its neutrality by claiming that “criticism of Israel is legitimate as long as it can also be leveled at any other country.” Yet, what we are seeing in public discourse, along within the academy in Europe and North America, is that the IHRA definition of antisemitism is being used to protect Israel from any legitimate criticism. Its purview appears to be the silencing of individuals, organizations, and protests articulating and organizing against the specific mass violence the Israeli State and its military infrastructure have committed.

Germany’s “Nie wieder ist jetzt” Resolution

Since October 7, 2023, Germany has engaged in a cultural campaign of censorship against critics of the genocide and apartheid of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Lebanon, and now Syria by the Israeli military and political establishment. From the attempted retraction of awards, such as journalist and writer Masha Gessen’s Hannah Arendt Prize for their criticism of Israeli military force in Gaza (Hill), to the removal of Palestinian discussions from public media (Eschritt) and violent police action against pro-Palestinian protestors and organizations (Schneider and Grimm), Germany has prioritized suppressing discussions and criticism of Israeli military violence under the guise of fighting antisemitism.

On November 5, 2024, Germany’s Bundestag unanimously approved the resolution “Nie wieder ist jetzt – Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland schützen, bewahren und stärken” (Never Again is Now – Protecting, Preserving and Strengthening Jewish Life in Germany). The resolution reinforces Germany’s commitment to combating present-day antisemitism while acknowledging the country’s tie to Holocaust history and atonement. However, the approved resolution casts through a broad and totalizing gesture right-wing antisemitism, “Islamic antisemitism,” and “left-wing anti-imperialistic antisemitism” as dangers to Jews in Germany and abroad (Deutscher Bundestag). By grouping right-wing antisemitism with “left-wing anti-imperialistic antisemitism,” the Bundestag deems anti-imperialism as inherently antisemitic. In so doing, the German government is using antisemitism to initiate state violence against victims of historical and current-day imperialism.

Also, by reasserting there is a form of “Islamic antisemitism,” the language of the resolution again returns to an Islamophobic trope about how Muslims “imported antisemitism” into Germany. In Germany’s official public narrative, the country atoned for its past crimes and the persistent antisemitism in Germany must somehow beimported (Özyürek). The drafters of the resolution found one scapegoat and casts all Muslims in Germany as suspects of antisemitism just for being Muslim. By extension, the resolution implies that people from Muslim communities both abroad and within Germany must be antisemitic.

Thus, the resolution covertly legitimizes anti-Palestinian racism and Islamophobia in Germany. It advances xenophobic discourses targeting Muslim and Arab Germans and exposes them to violence perpetrated by fascist groups and the German police. The Bundestag’s legislative approaches hollow out the term antisemitism and enable German bureaucracies to define antisemitism through their lens of anti-antisemitism, one that is supported by the IHRA definition, supports Islamaphobic discourses, and perpetuates violence against Palestinian and Muslim Germans.

The Bundestag resolution takes the codification of anti-antisemitism in a yet more dangerous direction. While the resolution reaffirms Germany’s longstanding commitment to protecting Jewish life since reunification, it undermines the country’s commitment to free speech, academic freedom, and the protection of Jews in Germany. The resolution’s wording transforms the discourse around antisemitism and Israel into a more hardline position, enabling the government to cut off funding to any academic or artistic project, organization, or individual who supports Palestinian liberation or criticizes the Israeli state—including those who describe it as practicing apartheid or, in current debates, genocide. The resolution states explicitly: 

“Der Deutsche Bundestag bekräftigt die haushaltsrechtlichen Regelungen für die Mittelvergabe auf dem Boden der freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung für alle Zuwendungsempfänger des Bundes. Der Deutsche Bundestag bekräftigt seinen Beschluss, dass sicherzustellen ist, dass keine Organisationen und Projekte finanziell gefördert werden, die Antisemitismus verbreiten, das Existenzrecht Israels in Frage stellen, die zum Boykott Israels aufrufen oder die die BDS-Bewegung aktiv unterstützen.” (2)

(The German Parliament reaffirms the fiscal regulations for the allocations of funding on the basis of the free democratic fundamental right for all recipients receiving federal funding. The German Parliament reaffirms its commitment to guarantee that no organisations nor projects are funded that spread antisemitism, question’s Israel’s right to exist, call for a boycott of Israel, or actively support the BDS movement.)

While claiming to protect freedom of expression, the government now requires institutions and individuals to adhere to the IHRA definition of antisemitism to receive funding. This approach is not new. The German government prevented the Goethe Institute from hosting writer, poet, and activist Mohammed El-Kurd from speaking about the rise of right-wing politics in Hamburg, Germany (“International Writers Stand Against Germany’s Anti-Palestinian Racism”). Achille Mbembe, a decolonial political theorist, faced a racist campaign in German media and was labelled antisemitic for critiquing Israel and drawing parallels between the Holocaust and colonialism in 2020. Both these examples of German censorship were based on the IHRA definition established by the German government’s Office for Jewish Life and Against Antisemitism (Zine & Matthews). This distinct formulation of antisemitism the resolution propagates ultimately makes it harder to combat antisemitism.

Felix Klein, the commissioner for Jewish Life in Germany, exemplified this stance in his response to the Palestinian National President Mahmoud Abbas, who compared Israel’s crimes to that of the Holocaust during his 2023 German visit. In Klein’s words, “By relativizing the Holocaust, President Abbas lacked any sensitivity towards us German hosts” (Kuras). Yet this is not only cast on Palestinian statesmen but ironically also on Israeli Jews living in Germany. Klein, in 2021, when being interviewed about the BDS resolution when asked about left-leaning Israelis in Germany, mentioned that they need to be sensitized to German history when critiquing Israel (Kuras). While Klein leads the Federal Office of Jewish Life in Germany and interacts with similar state level offices across Germany regarding Jewish life and fight against antisemitism, he and many of the other state officials in these types of positions are not Jewish, nor do they have specific trainings regarding antisemitism nor past history dealing with such matters (Kuras). Even though these officials do have support from the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland (The Central Council of Jews in Germany), the federation of Jewish religious communities in Germany, these actions underscore Germany’s systemic philosemitic tendencies that inevitability lead to monolithic and thus inherently antisemitic understandings of Jewishness.

Such discussions about antisemitism in Germany place Germans in the center rather than Jews because of the history of the Holocaust and Germany’s histories of atonement and reparation. German sensibilities take precedence over Jewish and Muslim protection. Germany’s insistence on Holocaust specificity and protection is not primarily about protecting Jews but about protecting non-Jewish Germans from being perceived as antisemitic. German sensibilities take precedence over Jewish and Muslim protection.

The Beginning of North America’s Anti-Antisemitism

While Germany’s anti-antisemitism discourse has unique characteristics, the discussion around antisemitism and Israel/Palestine is not an isolated situation. What is taking place in Germany should serve as a warning for Germanists and other scholars in North America, where similar discourses are emerging and comparable definitions of antisemitism are being used to restrict legitimate academic inquiry and critique.

Canada and the United States are becoming entrenched in debates about what constitutes antisemitism when discussing Israel/Palestine, and both have taken legislative action to adopt the IHRA working definition. The House inquiries in 2024 brought this issue to public attention. US Republican Congresswoman Elise Stefanik employed rhetorical strategies similar to those used in Germany to frame pro-Palestinian protests and university campus encampments as antisemitic. Stefanik’s tactics led to the resignation of the University of Pennsylvania President, Dr. Elizabeth Magill, and later Harvard’s President, Dr. Claudine Gay, after alumni and university donors pressured Harvard’s Board of Governors. These encampments, organized by the National Students for Justice in Palestine and supporters, primarily advocated for university divestment from Israeli companies, as well as universities from investing in companies that develop and ship military-grade weapons.

These debates in the United States resulted in H.R.6090, known as the Antisemitism Awareness Act (ASA) (“ACLU Condemns House”). This act aims to adopt the IHRA definition of antisemitism to be used by federal anti-discrimination laws, particularly in educational programs from elementary school to university levels. After passing the House in 2024, the bill was tabled in the Senate till the 2024 election. Following the inauguration of the 119th Congress and Donald Trump, a similar bill passed the House of Representatives and now introduced to the Senate by Senator Tim Scott (R-SC) with 40 cosponsors (20 Republicans and 20 Democrats). Like Germany’s approach, the ASA grants significant powers to the Department of Education’s Title VI Office through the Civil Rights Act to incorporate the IHRA definition into discrimination cases. This puts universities at risk of losing federal funding if they do not implement IHRA definitions of antisemitism and threatens to restrict pro-Palestinian research and critiques of Israel.

This attack on academic freedom and free speech in the US has escalated with President Trump’s Executive Order 14188 (“Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism). The executive order labels Palestinian solidarity protests on university campuses antisemitic (“Additional Measure”) and orders the Department of Education to begin investigating  policies regarding antisemitism complaints, putting institutions at risk of losing federal funding unless they comply. Additionally, the order direct the Department of Homeland Security and the Attorney General to monitor and possibly deport vulnerable students, faculty, and staff on US visas or green cards (permanent residence visas) (“Additional Measures”). The illegal abduction and incarceration by ICE (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement) of Columbia University student and green-card holder, Mohammed Khalil, exemplifies the extreme dangers of such policies based around problematic definitions of antisemitism (Khalil).

Policymakers in the United States continually note that US Jews overwhelmingly support Israel, citing imprecise statistics based on unclear and broad questions to support various anti-antisemitism legislation (Morganti). In Beri Weiss’s farewell article to the New York Times, for instance, she mentions that “95% support Israel,” yet the statistics she reports on were from 2015–2019 and with a sample size of 128 self-identifying religious Jews (Morganti). Similarly, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) suggests similarly high statistic, even more so, since October 7, 2023. The AJC released survey states that 85% of American Jews think that the US should support Israel after October 7. However, Peter Beinart in 2019 critiqued the AJC and its survey by noting that it was conducted using various misleading survey questions regarding BDS and framing of the statement “Israel has no right to exist.” Similar to Beinart’s earlier criticisms, the AJC’s 2024 survey contains leading questions about U.S. support for Israel post-October 7, using politically charged language, vague terminology, and response options that limit nuanced answers. By this logic, which many policymakers follow, Jews are being understood to be overwhelmingly discriminated against because of their attachment to Israel, but this formulation is misleading. The surveys cited are vague when defining relations with Israel; they do not consider a relationship with Israel that has experience with Israel but is distanced regarding political alignments (Morganti). Similarly, more recent surveys with larger sample sizes use debatable, vague terms for categorization, such as “pro-Israel.” Even though many of these recent surveys have gradients set to being pro-Israel (e.g., “overwhelmingly support Israeli policy; generally support Israel but do not support Israeli policy”), the aggregate is still termed in “pro-Israel” Zionist definitions (Morganti). Using problematic statistics and surveys about antisemitism undercuts honest discussion and solutions about antisemitism. Moreover, this creates a false understanding of American Jewry as a coherent political monolith, which is itself a form of antisemitism.  

At various Canadian universities, many administrators imposed court injunctions in an attempt to break up Palestinian solidarity protests (Loriggio; McCauly; Proctor). However, many of these injunctions were initially rejected by Canadian courts. Yet later, some encampments were forcibly removed. In the case of McGill University, it violently removed its 10-month university encampment with private contractors (Harris). In response, the Federal Canadian government’s Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights led investigations of antisemitic conduct on university campuses. The university encampment protests were framed as antisemitic in Canada by drawing on the IHRA definition of antisemitism. Canada adopted the use of IHRA in 2019 within its Anti-Racism Strategy, and the government reaffirmed its support for and implementation of IHRA in 2022.

In November 2024, the Canadian federal government released the “Canadian Handbook on the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism.” This document is meant to guide educational institutions, workplace organizations, and law enforcement to understand what is and is not antisemitism and implement the IHRA. The eleven examples found within the handbook are used within the framework of the IHRA definition of antisemitism; however, the handbook uses specific Canadian examples. Moreover, it attempts to respond to criticism regarding “misconceptions about the IHRA,” specifically how the IHRA does not silence criticism of Israel, instead, it claims to be an instrument by which to prevent specific forms of critique from sliding into discrimination (49–50). Unlike the United States and Germany, the handbook is not technically enforceable, by this the handbook is not meant to supersede any criminal laws that a respective jurisdiction has set. Rather, the handbook is to be used a guideline for how institutions could identify and consider certain acts as antisemitic. This is repeated throughout any measure used to adopt IHRA, but its adoption in law enforcement, and political bodies is nefarious. The IHRA is perhaps not codified into law by means of passage of bills or resolutions but is made available as a tool for policymakers to interpret certain acts and opinions as antisemitic.

However, since the release of the handbook, the Canadian Federal Government’s Standing Committee of Justice and Human Rights in early December 2024 released a report and suggestions to the federal government regarding the IHRA. The Standing Committee’s report outlines the various positions they heard in their investigations and hearings on the rise of antisemitism in Canada and specifically on antisemitism on university and college campuses. Similarly to the United States and Germany, the committee’s report encourages the inclusion of the use of the IHRA definition within university systems and within DEI frameworks. Moreover, the report encourages universities to oppose the Boycott Divestment and Sanction movement (BDS) and academic boycotts. The report reaffirms the claim that anti-Zionism is “the new antisemitism” (15). The Standing Committee attempts to be unbiased by stating they received briefs from advocacy groups that did not agree with the IHRA, specifically the Jewish Faculty Network (JFN) and Independent Jewish Voice for Peace (IJVP) (16). Moreover, the report mentions how both JFN and IJVP introduced the Jerusalem Declaration of Antisemitism (JDA) as an alternative to IHRA. Yet, the document does not mention and clarify on what the role of JDA is within the actual body of the report.

The JDA defines antisemitism as “discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish).” The definition also underscores guidelines on how antisemitism functions and notes precise guidelines of what does and does not constitute antisemitism regarding Israel/Palestine. Unlike the IHRA, however, the JDA is clear in it is mission to provide clear and precise examples of what constitutes antisemitism and allows space within the definition to be open for debate in complex discussions. The examples are to be taken in consideration between one another and for the certain context that the definition of antisemitism is being applied and underscores the importance that the fight against antisemitism is also an important struggle for the fight against all forms of oppression (racism, homophobia, sexism, and Islamophobia). The IHRA definition, on the other hand, uses each of its examples as one of many manifestations of antisemitism. The IHRA’s definition of antisemitism is paradoxically designed to be vague, yet concrete.  

The Standing Committee acknowledges the JDA as an alternative view held by many Canadian Jews, but they de facto side with “91% of Canadian Jews [who] believe that Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state” (16). The Standing Committee uses the survey from Canadian Jewish Studies titled “Jews and Israel 2024” undertaken by Dr. Robert Brym, a sociology professor emeritus from The University of Toronto. However, when taking a closer look Brym’s study it becomes clear that the surveyor does not directly ask participants if they self-identify as Zionist, instead he asked the participants if they believe Israel has a right to exist as Jewish state to be understood as Zionism. Harkening back to Beinart’s critique of the AJC’s framing of this very question, Brym instead opens up too much room for interpretation this question. Ironically many Canadian Jews consider themselves non-Zionists, but still have emotional attachments to the state of Israel and do support the state of Israel to be a Jewish state (Maltz).

Again, analogous to statistics cited in the United States, the 91% statistic has been problematized and debunked. Instead, the opinion regarding Israeli policies and support amongst Canadian Jews is diverse. An extensive 2018 survey of the Canadian Jewish community directed by Dr. Diana Ralph, sponsored by Independent Jewish Voices, and the United Jewish People’s Order asked various questions that could delineate statistics via ethnicity, religion/ secular, and political affiliation. The survey found that 30% of Canadian Jews have negative perceptions and stances of the Israeli government; 58% believe it is not antisemitic to critique Israeli policies, and 48% agree accusations of antisemitism silence fair criticism of Israel (Ralph, 45–46). Ralph’s survey statistics provide more nuanced data concerning the stances of Canadian Jews on the issue Israel/Palestine. Canadian policymakers, like their United States counterparts, are forming policies and framing discussion on antisemitism and antizionism on dishonest statistics.

Similarly to Germany and the United States, the recommendations contained within the Standing Committee’s report tie organizations and, specifically, educational institutions to the IHRA to receive federal funding. As Recommendation 9 states:

“That, building on the efforts of the Department of Canadian Heritage, the Government of Canada take additional measures to ensure that recipients of government funding:

• comply with Canada's anti-discrimination and anti-hate laws;

• respect the values underlying the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Human Rights Act; and

• do not advocate intolerance, discrimination, prejudice, racism or hate

Such measures should include enhancements to vetting processes, and provisions allowing the Government of Canada to terminate a funding agreement immediately and reclaim all funds paid out to date should the recipient be found not to meet the above conditions.” (46)

Many supporters of the IHRA, the handbook, and the committee reports continue to declare that the IHRA does not limit speech or academic freedom. Yet by connecting the IHRA definition with anti-discrimination laws and Equity, Divestment, and Inclusion initiatives, it seeks to hollow out academic freedom in Canadian educational institutions when it comes to discussion of Israel on university campuses.

Conclusion: A Troubling Trajectory

The adoption (or attempts to adopt) of the IHRA definition in Germany, the United States, and Canada reveals a concerning pattern in how antisemitism is being defined and addressed in academic and public spaces. While these initiatives claim to protect against discrimination, they have instead created mechanisms that potentially restrict academic freedom and legitimate political discourse, particularly regarding discussions of Israel-Palestine relations.

The recent events at American universities, the Canadian government’s approach through its IHRA Handbook, and the “Nie wieder ist jetzt” resolution in Germany demonstrate how anti-antisemitism frameworks can be weaponized to silence protest and academic inquiry. By tying institutional funding to compliance with IHRA definitions, these policies create a chilling effect on campus discourse, scholarly research, and cultural production.

Most troublingly, these policies have emerged alongside broader political shifts that threaten to undermine the academic freedoms and civil rights they purport to protect. The resignation and firing of university presidents, the suppression of campus protests, the detention and deportation of protestors and academics, and the potential restriction of state and federal funding highlight how IHRA can be used to exercise institutional control rather than combat genuine antisemitism.

It is crucial to find ways to effectively combat antisemitism while preserving academic freedom and protecting legitimate political expression. By developing more nuanced approaches that can distinguish between actual antisemitism and valid criticism of state policies, efforts to combat discrimination do not suppress essential dialogue and debate. This needs to be our task as Germanists: We need to resist these types of institutional mechanisms that are attempting to conflate pro-Palestinian advocacy with antisemitism. It not only undermines legitimate political expression but also perpetuates cycles of misunderstanding and conflict. Moreover, these dangerous misunderstandings and conflations also casts Jews writ large as a monolith, which is in itself antisemitic. A truly practical approach to combating antisemitism must acknowledge that supporting Palestinian human rights and opposing antisemitism are not mutually exclusive positions but rather must coexist in any genuine pursuit of social justice.

Acknowledgment

I thank my friend, colleague, and comrade, Shoshana Schwebel, for being a true Mensch and providing brilliant insights and valuable feedback on previous drafts of this contribution.   

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